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Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress

of Biomedicine

Allowing universities to patent the results of government-sponsored
research sometimes works against the public interest
Arti . Rai and Rebecca S. Eisenberg

Although
the development
of pharmaceuti
cal compounds
has long been a commercial
enterprise, the broader field of biomedicai re

This policy, which began in 1980 with passage
of the Bayh-Dole Act, has turned universities

knowledge. But the culture of open science has

into major players in the biotech business.

eroded considerably over the past quarter

century. Proprietary claims have increasingly
moved upstream, from the end products them
selves to the ground-breaking discoveries that
made them possible in the first place. One im
portant reason for this change has been a nar
rowing of the gap between fundamental re
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drug discovery now depends critically on basic
knowledge of genes, proteins and associated
biochemical pathways. In addition, the practical
payoffs of basic research have become easy to
anticipate in many cases, making it straightfor
ward to obtain patents for discoveries that in an
earlier era would have seemed too far removed
from useful application to warrant the effort.
This shift in patenting activity has met little

resistance. For example, in 1980 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that genetically engi

neered microorganisms were eligible for patent
protection. Shortly thereafter, Congress created

a specialized court to hear appeals in patent
matters, the Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit, which has further extended the

tual property law and the legal

Supreme Court's expansive approach to patent
eligibility. The Federal Circuit has also relaxed
the standards normally required for patent

regulation of science. This arti

protection, such as proof of the practical utility
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cy of allowing grantees to seek patent rights for
the results of government-sponsored research.

one that allows the free sharing of scientific

search has enjoyed a very different tradition,

Arti . Rai earned her under

more significant has been the explicit U.S. poli

These changes in the economics of research
and in the interpretation of the patent laws
have been important factors in the proliferation

of intellectual property claims for discoveries

of a fundamental nature. But perhaps even

The Bayh-Dole Act was intended to pro

mote the widespread use of federally funded
inventions. The sponsors of the legislation be

lieved that permitting grantees to obtain

patent rights and to convey exclusive licenses
for their inventions to private corporations

would motivate investors to pick up where

the government left off. This process, it was
hoped, would produce commercial products
from discoveries that might otherwise lan
guish in the halls of academe.
This goal is, of course, quite noble. But the
law draws no distinction between inventions
that lead directly to commercial products and
fundamental advances that enable further sci

entific studies. Universities have taken the op
portunity to file patent applications on discov

eries like new DNA sequences, protein

structures and disease pathways?results that

are primarily valuable because they enable

more investigation. Columbia University, for
example, now holds a portfolio in which 50
percent of its licensed patents represent such
research tools. And even when they do not
seek patents, universities often try to preserve
their expectations for profitable payoffs by im
posing restrictions on the dissemination of ma

terials and reagents that might generate com
mercial value somewhere down the line.
This frenzy of proprietary claiming has coin
cided with unprecedented levels of both public

and private investment in biopharmaceutical
research and development?and magnificent
progress in health care. So for many people, it
may be difficult to see that there is any prob
lem. But in the long run the current system
may, paradoxically, hinder rather than acceler
ate biomedicai research. Here we explore how
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Figure 1. Today certain drugs are routinely manufactured using genetically engineered bacteria, which are grown in reactors such as this one.
Some attribute the widespread use of recombinant bacteria, and the rapid rise of the biotechnology industry in general, to the cheap, nonex
clusive licensing of the underlying patent for shuffling genes into bacteria, which Stanley Cohen (then of Stanford University) and Herbert Boy
er (then of the University of California, San Francisco) were granted in 1980. But few people have asked whether the results of this publicly
funded research should have been patented in the first place rather than made freely available. The authors, both law professors, explore this
question and suggest ways to manage the increasingly broad proprietary claims of government-supported research institutions. (Photograph
courtesy of BioReliance Corporation.)

the current system emerged and what could lowing year. In 1997, for instance, U.S. univer
sities received 2,436 patents, a nearly 10-fold

be done to fix some of its problems.

Gold in Them There Halls

increase in 17 years. This rise was significantly
greater than the twofold increase in the overall

In 1979, U.S. universities were granted only rate of patenting during the same time period
264 patents. But the statistics changed quickly and also exceeded growth in university re
after the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act the fol search spending. Biomedicai discoveries ac
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Figure 2. Growth in university patent activity in the United States over the past few decades has been tremen
dous. Biomedicai patents account for an increasingly large fraction, now approaching 50 percent. (Data courtesy
of Bhaven N. Sampat, Georgia Institute of Technology.)

count for a large share of these patents, partic
ularly in terms of licensing revenues.

The majority of this patented research was
publicly funded. (Despite the increasingly inti
mate involvement of industry with universi
ties, private companies actually fund only a
small percentage of university-based research
in the life sciences.) A prominent recent exam
ple involves embryonic stem cells. In the 1990s,

the National Institutes of Health (NIH) spon
sored research at the University of Wisconsin

that succeeded in deriving such cells from

rhesus monkeys and macaques. The NIH
sponsored research on primates yielded a

broad patent for the Wisconsin Alumni Re
search Foundation, the technology-transfer
arm of the University of Wisconsin, which is

sued an exclusive license to Geron Corpora

tion. This patent covers all lines of embryonic
stem cells for primates, including humans (al
though for complicated reasons, Geron now
holds rights to just three types of differentiated

human embryonic stem cells).

Clearly, NIH has a strong interest in ensur

ing the widespread dissemination of such

broadly enabling research tools. But the Bayh
Dole Act significantly restricts what NIH can
do. As long as the*.contractor is based in the
United States, funding agencies may restrict
patenting only in "exceptional circumstances,"
when they determine that withholding title to
the invention will better promote the goals of

the Act. The Bayh-Dole legislation also pro
vides administrative procedures under which
a grantee can challenge the determination of
exceptional circumstances, with a right of ap
peal to the U.S. Claims Court. In addition, the

agency must notify the Commerce Depart

ment, which has primary responsibility for ad
ministering this law, each time it claims excep
tional circumstances, and it must provide an
analysis justifying the action. If the Secretary of

Commerce decides that "any individual deter
mination or pattern of determinations is con
trary to the policies and objectives of [the
Bayh-Dole Act]," he or she must advise the
head of the agency and the Administrator of
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and
recommend corrective actions. Given these
cumbersome procedures, it is perhaps not sur
prising that NIH declarations of exceptional
circumstances have been extremely rare. In
deed, we are aware of only a single case.
The Bayh-Dole Act also permits an agency
to compel licensing of the patents that result
from research it had previously funded. But an
agency can do so only if it determines that the

Figure 3. The Wright brothers did not license their wing-warping technique (shown in
this drawing from the Wrights' 1906 patent) to the other major American aircraft maker
of the time, the Curtiss Aeroplane Company, until compelled to do so by the govern
ment at the outbreak of World War I. This history aptly illustrates how proprietary
claims can thwart the development of an emerging technology.

university (or its exclusive licensee) is not tak
ing steps to achieve "practical application of
the subject invention" or if such licensing is
necessary "to alleviate public health or safety
needs or requirements for public use specified
by Federal regulations." Exercise of such rights

is not subject to an overarching directive that

the circumstances be "exceptional." None
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theless, the Bayh-Dole Act seriously restricts eries necessary for subsequent work are owned
the value of this provision by deferring such not by just one company, but by a number of
actions pending elaborate administrative pro different entities.
Concern about an "anticommons" or "prop
ceedings and exhaustion of court appeals. The

administrative obstacles have proved suffi erty rights thicket" is quite pressing in contem

ciently high that NIH has never once exercised porary biomedicai research, which often draws
this option.
from many prior discoveries made by different
scientists in universities and private compa
Out of Reach
nies. Exchanges of DNA sequences, laboratory
animals, reagents and data that were once
Although the idea of private universities earn
ing large sums of money from publicly spon
shared freely are today subject to licenses, ma
terial-transfer and database-access agreements.
sored research may be troubling enough for
These arrangements have to be reviewed and
many the real problem with the Bayh-Dole Act
is that it often puts such academic research ad
negotiated before research may proceed.
A standard response to these fears is that
vances out of the reach. Although one might
market forces will motivate the emergence of
imagine that patent holders don't enforce their
patents for noncommercial uses, some have in
patent pools and other institutions for bundling
intellectual property rights. But this prediction
fact been quite aggressive in this regard, insist
has not yet been borne out. Indeed, when rep
ing that university investigators sign license
agreements, especially when they seek to
resentatives of biopharmaceutical companies
transfer materials covered by a patent rather
have seen the potential for an anticommons,
than simply practicing a patented technique
they have reacted not by forming patent pools,
inconspicuously in their own labs. Given that
but rather by strengthening the public domain.

patent law offers no significant exemption
from liability for experimental use and that the

division between noncommercial and com
mercial research can be blurry, it is indeed fool
hardy for academic scientists to rely on the for

bearance of patent holders.

Thus some patents can stall scientific

progress. This concern is particularly acute for

claims to early-stage discoveries that open up
entirely new fields. Such patents may be quite
broad, permitting their owners to control a
wide range of subsequent research. One reply

The case of single nucleotide polymor

phisms, or SNPs, provides an interesting exam
ple of this phenomenon. Collections of SNPs
are found throughout the genome and are a
useful resource for scientists searching for
genes involved in specific diseases. These SNPs
also promise to be useful in developing diag

nostic and therapeutic products. In recent

years, various biotechnology companies have
identified and sought patents on large numbers
of SNPs, provoking concern on the part of both

NIH and the pharmaceutical industry about

to this argument is that profit-seeking owners

the potential for balkanization of intellectual

of pioneering patents will find it in their own
best interest to disseminate their discoveries to

property rights to this important resource. Para

as many follow-on improvers as possible. His

joyed more latitude than NIH to respond to this

tory shows otherwise. The Wright brothers, for

example, refused to offer reasonable licensing
terms for some of their aeronautical innova

doxically, the pharmaceutical industry has en
threat by placing SNPs in the public domain.

tions until compelled to do so by the govern

ment. One notable recent example in the

pharmaceutical industry is the controversy
generated when DuPont imposed restrictions
on academic investigators wishing to use its
"oncomouse" technology, which DuPont con
trols under an exclusive license from Harvard

University, the patentee.
Why would a company not want to license
its technology as widely as possible? Isn't that
how it makes money? One reason is that issu
ing such licenses requires considerable time
and effort. Given the imperfect information
available to the parties involved, the disparate
assessments of value to the technology and the

danger that one side might misappropriate the
research plans of the other once they are dis
closed in the course of negotiations, the trans
action costs associated with such bargaining
are likely to be quite high. And these costs
mount quickly when the basic research discov

Figure 4. Controversy surrounds the so-called "oncomouse," an animal that has been
genetically engineered to be prone to cancer. The technology, patented by investiga
tors at Harvard Medical School, is licensed to DuPont, which demands that all those

using such animals?even academic investigators?sign license agreements. (Photo
graph courtesy of Harvard Medical School.)
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Pharmaceutical companies have joined togeth
er with the nonprofit Wellcome Trust (a U.K.
based nongovernmental partner in the Human
Genome Project, which is not bound by the
Bayh-Dole Act) in a consortium to sponsor an
SNP-identification effort with explicit instruc

tions to put the information in the public do
main. The SNP Consortium has candidly em

braced a goal of defeating patent claims to
SNPs. The willingness of private companies in
a patent-sensitive industry to spend money to
enhance the public domain is indeed curious.

We think it is powerful evidence of a perception
in industry that claims to intellectual property

rights for fundamental discoveries can create
significant barriers to subsequent research and

product development.

Possible Fixes
One solution might involve changing the
patent laws to restrict patents on fundamental
research. Congress or the courts might, for ex

ample, reinvigorate the "products of nature"
limitation on patent eligibility so as to exclude

discoveries of DNA sequences, proteins and

biochemical mech?nisms from patent protec
tion. Lawmakers and judges could also fortify
the utility standard to limit the patenting of re

search tools. Another much-discussed idea is
to provide an exemption from infringement li

ability for research, particularly noncommer
cial research. Although such legal adjustments
are worth considering, it is difficult to calibrate
these changes accurately, and the consequences

of overdoing it could be grave.
Patents clearly matter to the biopharmaceuti

cal industry, and undue restrictions on them
may indeed deter private investment. Although
it is possible that these companies?particularly

those that make end products?would benefit

in the long term from limits on certain patents,
many of these businesses continue to insist that

they need patents on their research to raise
capital. Given that private investment in bio

medical research and development today ex

ceeds public funding, the strong belief of in
vestors that patents are essential urges caution
in changing the underlying legal rules.

When research is publicly sponsored, how

ever, the argument for strong patent rights los

es much of its force. The Bayh-Dole Act does

Figure 5. Single-nucleotide polymorphisms, or SNPs, are variations in genetic se not presume that patents are necessary to mo
quence found at an appreciable frequency (greater than 1 percent) in different indi tivate grantees to perform research but rather
viduals of the same species. This mapping shows the known distribution of SNPs on that patents will promote subsequent utiliza

human chromosome 1, with the names of some indicated at the right. The variation in
the DNA base sequence that constitutes SNP WIAF-2068 is shown at top, with G, C, A

tion and development of inventions. The rea
soning that lurks behind this presumption is

and representing, respectively, the bases guanine, cytosine, adenine and thymine.
that patents and exclusive licenses are essential
Biologists anticipate that an understanding of the genetic diversity now being quan
to attract the necessary private investment.
tified in this way will have various biomedicai uses?for example, in determining an
Whatever
the merits of this presumption for
individual's susceptibility to certain heritable diseases. Both the National Institutes of
patents
on
final products such as new drugs, it
Health and a consortium of private companies have been pushing to keep SNP data in
the public domain, for fear that too many proprietary claims on this information will

makes little sense for patents on broadly en

impede its use in medicine. (Data from the Whitehead Institute/MIT Center for abling information and techniques that are
Genome Research.)
ready for dissemination to scientists in both
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public and private institutions, advances that
can be put to use in the laboratory right away,
without any further investment.

A classic example is the Cohen-Boyer

method for combining DNA from different or
ganisms. Many observers attribute the rapid
progress of the biotechnology industry to the

fact that this technology was made widely

available rather than licensed exclusively to a
single company. Although this pre-Bayh-Dole
technology was, in fact, patented, it was offered

nonexclusively and cheaply to encourage com
panies to purchase licenses rather than to chal
lenge the patents. These nonexclusive licenses
generated some $300 million for the universi
ties that owned the patents, but it is difficult to

see how they did anything to enhance product
profitability or otherwise motivate subsequent
research and development. If anything, the
patent royalties imposed a modest tax on prod
uct development.
A greater concern is that the Bayh-Dole Act
does little to ensure that a university will li
cense such patents nonexclusively. To the con
trary, Congress was careful in the terms of the
Bayh-Dole Act and subsequent legislation to
give universities discretion to grant exclusive
licenses, which may be more financially attrac
tive than nonexclusive licensing. Exclusive li
censes typically command higher royalties,
and companies holding exclusive licenses are
more willing to reimburse for patent costs and
to provide additional grant funding to the in
ventor. Indeed, the information available sug
gests that the majority of university licenses to
startups and small businesses are exclusive.
But it is not clear that such exclusive licens

es are necessary to achieve the aims of the

Figure 6. Evista (an osteoporosis-prevention drug, left) and Xigris (administered to pa

tients endangered by sepsis, right) were developed by Eli Lilly & Co. using basic
knowledge of the NF- biochemical pathway, which was worked out by scientists at
Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Whitehead Institute for
Biomedicai Research. Those institutions patented this basic research result and li
censed it exclusively to Ariad Pharmaceuticals, which is now suing Lilly for in
fringement of its patent and also demanding royalties from some 50 other companies
with drugs based on the NF- pathway. This episode demonstrates that companies
are often eager to develop the results of academic biomedicai research without first
obtaining exclusive rights to it. (Photographs courtesy of Eli Lilly & Co.)

sent letters to some 50 other companies with

products that work via the NF- pathway,
demanding royalties on present or future

product sales. Obviously, the companies that
are now being asked to pay royalties did not
need an exclusive license from Harvard, MIT
and Whitehead to motivate them to pursue
product development; the prospect of obtain
ing patents on their own end products was
sufficient. In this case, as in many others, pio

neering patents issued to academic institu
tions only thwart innovation.
For many discoveries emerging from gov
ernment-sponsored research, the benefits of

Bayh-Dole Act. A recent case in which patent
ing and subsequent exclusive licensing were patenting are low relative to its costs. But some
not necessary for product development in discoveries, including some important research
volves federally funded research that identi tools and enabling technologies generated in
fied the cell-signalling pathway for NF-kB the course of publicly sponsored research, un
(nuclear factor kappa B), which regulates doubtedly require substantial commercial in
genes that function during inflammation, cell vestment to become reliably mass-produced

proliferation and programmed cell death.

for widespread distribution. For example, tech

This research (which scientists at Harvard, the nologies and machines for DNA sequencing
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the and analysis, initially developed in academic
Whitehead Institute for Biomedicai Research laboratories, required substantial follow-up in
carried out in the 1980s) led to a broad patent vestment by private companies to turn them
claiming all drugs that work by inhibiting into reliable and commercially available equip
NF-Kb cell signaling. Because the NF- path ment. Patents and exclusive licenses may be

way has been implicated in diseases ranging crucial to motivate this sort of investment.
from cancer and osteoporosis to atherosclero

The policy challenge, then, is to devise a sys

sis and rheumatoid arthritis, the patent? tem that distinguishes cases in which propri
which was issued just last year?may cover etary claims make sense from cases in which

drug treatments for all of these diseases. In
deed, these academic institutions, together
with their exclusive licensee, Ariad Pharma
ceuticals, are now suing Eli Lilly & Co., claim
ing that Lilly's osteoporosis drug Evista and
its sepsis drug Xigris work in a manner that

they do not. The complexity of biomedicai re
search makes this a formidable task, and the

public interest in getting these determinations

right demands assigning this responsibility to

the most qualified body. Ideally, decisions

about the dividing line between the public do
infringes the NF- patent. Ariad has also main and private property should be made by
2003 January-February 57
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effort needed to preserve the research com
mons. But, interestingly, on a number of occa
sions NIH has been able to use sternly worded
appeals to the norms of open science to con
vince academic institutions to keep basic re
search in the public domain. For example, in
1996 leaders of the National Human Genome
Research Institute (NHGRI), together with the
Wellcome Trust and academic researchers at
the major human genome mapping centers, re

solved that "all human genomic DNA se

quence information, generated by centers
funded for large-scale human sequencing,

should be freely available and in the public do
main in order to encourage research and de
velopment and to maximize its benefit to soci
ety." The NHGRI followed up with a policy
statement making "rapid release of data into
public databases" a condition for grants for

large-scale human genome sequencing. The

NIH could not, however, go so far as to forbid
its grantees from filing patent applications

without relying on the cumbersome "excep

tional circumstances" clause of the Bayh-Dole
Act. Rather than take this step, NIH declared
that, as a matter ?f doctrine and policy, raw
Figure 7. Development of DNA sequencing machines into reliable commercial prod
human genomic DNA sequence information
ucts required considerable private investment. Few companies would have pursued
should not be considered patentable. The state
such development without patent protection.

ment also warned that NHGRI would moni

tor whether grantees were patenting "large
the tensions between widespread access and blocks of primary human genomic DNA se
preservation of commercial incentives without quence" and threatened to invoke the "excep
being unduly swayed by motivations that di tional circumstances" limitation in future
grants. In the specific context of large-scale
verge from the overall public interest.
genome mapping, universities were willing to
embrace this policy.
Preserving the Commons
Administrators at NIH undertook a similar
So where should these decisions be made? On
institutions that are in a position to appreciate

first examination, one might think that universi
ties, which reap the rewards of the proprietary
restrictions they impose on others but also pay
the costs of restrictions that others impose on
them, might be interested in maintaining at least

strategy for SNPs. Before the SNP Consor

tium stepped forward to place this informa
tion in the public domain, NIH had decided
to allocate public funds for SNP identifica
tion. Once again, NIH refrained from invok

ing the "exceptional circumstances" provi
sion of the Bayh-Dole Act. Instead, in its
borne by its scientists who cannot get prompt request for applications for SNP-related
some research in the public domain. The prob
lem is that the costs to a university are largely

access to the proprietary technologies they seek, grants, the agency stressed the importance of
whereas the gains from licensing revenues are making information about SNPs readily

much more salient to its technology-transfer of
ficers, who are charged with generating revenue.
So corning to a consensus might be difficult.

available to the research community and

if they shared their research tools more freely,

The efforts of NIH to constrain its grantees in

asked grant applicants to specify their plans
for sharing data, materials and software. The
Even when universities recognize that the NIH also warned that it reserved the right to
larger academic community might be better off monitor their patenting activity.

they face a serious problem: ensuring collec pursuing intellectual property rights have not
tive action. So long as other institutions are been limited to genome projects. A more gener
staking out claims, no university is likely to ab al statement of "Principles and Guidelines for
stain from asserting its own rights. Appeal to Sharing of Biomedicai Research Resources,"
the traditions of open science may not be suffi

adopted by NIH in December 1999, also at

cient, especially given that the scientists who tempts to guide NIH grantees regarding propri
hold those values don't usually make decisions etary rights. These principles state that "the use
regarding assertions of proprietary rights.

of patents and exclusive licenses is not the only

Left to their own devices, universities prob nor in some cases the most appropriate, means
ably cannot mount the sustained community of implementing the [Bayh-Dole] Act. Where
58 American Scientist, Volume 91

This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Tue, 10 Jan 2017 18:21:52 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

agencies to decide that patenting is not war
ranted in particular cases, while streamlining
procedures for making and reviewing these
decisions. Giving greater discretion to agencies
commercialization, and public availability."
What NIH has sought to achieve through would also correct a dangerous oversimplifi
these various statements is broadly consistent cation of how best to achieve the important
policies underlying the Bayh-Dole Act, by rec
with the intent of the Bayh-Dole legislation "to
promote the utilization of inventions arising ognizing that patenting and exclusive licens
from federally supported research or develop ing are not always the best way to go.
the subject invention is useful primarily as a re
search tool, inappropriate licensing practices are
likely to thwart rather than promote utilization,

ment." Arguably, however, at least with respect

to patentable inventions, NIH has acted out Bibliography
side the scope of its authority, leaving itself Rai, A. . 1999. Regulating scientific research: intellectu
al property rights and the norms of science. North
vulnerable to legal challenge.
western University Law Review 94:77-152.

Sound Footing
The time is ripe to fine-tune the Bayh-Dole Act
to give funding agencies more latitude in guid

ing the patenting and licensing activities of

their grantees. We propose two modest re

forms that would give these agencies, which
have the proper combination of knowledge
and incentives, somewhat greater discretion to
determine when publicly funded discoveries
should be put in the public domain.
First, the circumstances in which an agency
may prevent its contractor from retaining title

to an invention should be liberalized. The cur

rent language of the law creates a clear pre
sumption that an agency should exercise this

power very infrequently. That should be

changed. Once the "exceptional circum

stances" language is deleted, the law could be
more freely applied to achieve the goal of pro
moting widespread dissemination and use of

Campbell, E. G., B. R. Clarridge, M. Gokhale, L. Biren
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82:1663-1683.

Gelijns, A. C, and S. O. Thier. 2002. Medical innovation
and institutional independence: rethinking universi
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research results. The process for review of "ex

ceptional circumstance" determinations should
be streamlined as well, with provisions for re
search to proceed while examination of the de
cision runs its course.

Links to Internet resources for further exploration

of "Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine" are available on the American
Scientist Web site;

Second, Congress should modify the require
ment that a funding agency's authority to com

pel licensing of university patents be held in
abeyance until all court appeals are exhausted.
By the same token, however, an agency should

http: / / wwwamericanscientist.org/
articles/(Bar tides/ rai.html

not be given authority to act without some pro

vision for judicial review. Unlike a determina
tion to restrict patenting, a subsequent exercise
of the right to compel licensing disturbs settled
expectations. If business planning is too readily

upset, industry could become wary of invest
ing in university-based technology.
It might be argued that restoring greater au

thority to agencies would return us to the un

happy position that motivated Congress to

pass the Bayh-Dole Act in the first place. This
danger appears quite small. In the intervening

23 years, NIH has embraced patenting and
technology transfer in furtherance of its mis
sion of improving public health. Moreover, our

proposal to give agencies greater authority

would not overturn the general presumption
in favor of allowing government contractors to

patent inventions. It would simply permit
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